

Echoes from Kremlin

New Platforms, Old Narratives

Dr. Martins Hirss

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Banning the Kremlin's media didn't kill the message – it just changed the channel.

This study examines the most popular narratives circulating on problematic and openly Kremlin-aligned Russian-language social media accounts in Latvia, which remain freely accessible even after the country's ban on Russia's TV channels and online news sources.

Civil Resilience Initiative: Disinformation Monitoring

More information: <https://balticdisinfo.eu/>

The opinions presented here belong to the author and do not represent the views of any project partners, or any governmental or other entities.

About the author

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Executive Summary

This study examines narratives in the most popular problematic Russian-language social media outlets freely accessible in Latvia. These include the Facebook pages of *Baltijas Balss* and *Press*, as well as the Telegram channels *Roslikov*, *Sprats in Exile*, *Baltnews*, and *Antifascists of Pribaltics*. In a content analysis of the top 100 most popular posts within each outlet, six dominant narrative clusters emerged. Each designed to shape negative public perception and undermine confidence in Latvia and the West.

Major narratives, July – December 2024 (% share of all monitored posts)

Russophobia	Economic Hardships	Failed State	Bad West	Decadent Liberal Values	Supporting Russia In War
18%	7%	12%	13%	3%	4%

Russophobia

Most popular in:



One of the most resonant narratives portrays Latvia as fundamentally hostile to Russian people, language, and culture. Major sub-narratives and their relative share of all monitored posts:

- 5% Latvians Harass Russian Speakers:** Depicts everyday discrimination through anecdotal incidents of mistreatment, fostering a perception of deepening ethnolinguistic tensions.
- 7% Government Discriminates Russophones:** Frames government policies toward Russophone community as systematic and deliberate discrimination.
- 6% Persecution of Russian Speakers:** The most extreme variant employs emotionally charged language, exaggerations, and fabrications to portray Latvian authorities and nationalists as actively seeking to eradicate Russian language, culture, and people from Latvia.

Economic Hardships

Most popular in:




This narrative cluster emphasizes Latvia's economic challenges, resonating strongly with audiences by often amplifying real economic concerns while distorting their causes and severity.

- 2% Rising Costs of Living:** Highlights inflation in everyday goods and services while emphasizing inadequate salaries and pensions, generating frustration and dissatisfaction.
- 3% Economic Decline:** Presents Latvia as experiencing widespread economic deterioration through selective examples of business closures and decaying infrastructure.
- 2% Government Economic Mismanagement:** Frames Latvia as in economic decline and attributes economic problems to government mismanagement combining two master-narratives.

Failed State

Most popular in:



These anti-government narratives frame the Latvian state as incompetent, inefficient and self-serving.

- 4% Incompetent Government:** Portrays Latvia's government as incapable of solving real problems, mocking leadership figures, highlighting policy failures and infrastructure issues to paint a picture of systemic dysfunction and collapse.
- 2% Government Economic Mismanagement:** Frames Latvia as in economic decline and attributes economic problems to government mismanagement combining two master-narratives.
- 4% Corrupt and Self-Serving Government:** Depicts a divide between "the people" and corrupt political elites who enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary citizens.

Bad West

Most popular in:



These narratives employ contradictory characterizations of Western countries and institutions to undermine their credibility.

- 7% Aggressive West:** Portrays NATO, the US, and EU as irrational, Russophobic aggressors preparing for war against Russia, using Ukraine and Baltic states as proxies.
- 3% Hypocritical West:** Highlights alleged contradictions between stated Western values and actions, portraying Western powers as morally inconsistent and undemocratic.
- 2% Weak West:** Depicts Western powers and international organizations as declining in influence and effectiveness, militarily insufficient, and unable to address global challenges.

Other narratives

These two clear sub-narratives also stand out, albeit with less impact than the other master narratives.

- 3% Decadent Liberal Values:** portrays liberal values as decadent threats to traditional norms, occasionally misrepresenting Latvia's government positions to provoke moral outrage.
- 4% Supporting Russia in War:** discredits Ukraine and Western support to it while exaggerating Russian military successes.



These narratives work in concert to create a comprehensive worldview, fostering discontent among Russian-speaking target audiences. While the first three are explicitly about Latvia, the latter three are mostly related to a broader international context, with only occasional references to Latvia. Although there were false stories among the most popular posts, many of these posts tap into deeply ingrained identities, values, attitudes, and beliefs of their audiences, rather than relying on blatantly fabricated, easy to spot disinformation.

Introduction

Up till 2021 Russian propaganda was freely accessible in Latvia, predominantly through highly popular TV channels and online news outlets. According to 2022 survey, 71% of Russophones consumed currently banned Russia based or Russia supported media outlets.ⁱ However, after the ban of these outlets, Kremlin-aligned narratives still permeate Latvia via social networks. This leads to two research questions at the center of this study:

- What narratives are disseminated by most popular Russian language social media outlets?
- What narratives are the most resonant with the followers of these outlets?

Due to increasingly hostile Russian foreign policy, Latvia's Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) started banning Kremlin-aligned and Russia-based TV channels in the first half of 2021 – even before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These included the most popular Russian-language channels in Latvia: PBK, RTR Planeta Baltija, NTV Mir Baltic, and REN TV Baltic. After the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NEPLP closed most of the remaining Russia-based TV channels and online news outlets still available in Latvia. Following the ban, the consumption of Russia-based TV channels and online news outlets has been declining in Latvia. In Fall 2023 only 14% of Russophones admitted they were consuming banned Russian media, predominantly through YouTube.ⁱⁱ

However, the ban of Russian TV channels and online news webpages has not addressed the problem of Russian propaganda seeping into Latvia via social networks. Latvian government did ban access to Russian social media Odnoklasniki and V Kontakte. However, these were rather unpopular, fringe social networks outlets. As identified in previous reportsⁱⁱⁱ and as this study will further demonstrate, Telegram has become a key channel for the dissemination of Kremlin-aligned narratives in Latvia. Additionally, such narratives have historically been present on the Facebook pages of major Russian-language news outlets operating in the country.^{iv} Telegram is used at least once a week roughly by a third (32%) of Latvia's population. Telegram is more popular than X (used weekly by 15%), but less popular than TikTok (43%), Instagram (53%), Facebook (79%) and YouTube (83%).^v

This study examines problematic narratives disseminated on Telegram and Facebook, focusing on six highly popular and influential outlets: *Baltijas Balss*, *Press*, *Roslikov*, *Sprats in Exile*, *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics*. It analyzes the top 100 posts from each outlet during the period from July to December 2024. By focusing on the most popular posts, the study identifies the key narratives promoted by each outlet and evaluates their resonance with audiences, enabling the development of a distinct most resonant narrative profile for each outlet. Additionally, the study offers insight into the emotional and rhetorical appeals that make these narratives particularly compelling to the followers of the monitored social media outlets.

ⁱ Pētījums par mediju un tehnoloģiju lietošanas paradumiem Latvijā un mediju vides attīstības tendencēm. (2023). CIVITTA p. 154-155 <https://www.neplp.lv/lv/media/6708/download?attachment>

ⁱⁱ Pētījums par mediju un tehnoloģiju lietošanas paradumiem Latvijā un mediju vides attīstības tendencēm. (2023). CIVITTA p. 154-155 <https://www.neplp.lv/lv/media/6708/download?attachment>

ⁱⁱⁱ Tetarenko – Supe, A. (2023). *Kremlin's propaganda in our pockets. How disinformation thrives on Telegram*. LETA, Specially for Re:Baltica. Retrieved from: <https://en.rebaltica.lv/2023/07/kremlins-propaganda-in-our-pockets-how-disinformation-thrives-on-telegram/>.

^{iv} Hirss, M. (2021). *Kremlin-aligned "media" in Latvia: Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors*. GLOBSEC. <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/Kremlin-aligned-media-in-Latvia-Kingdom-of-Crooked-Mirrors.pdf>

^v *Latvijas sabiedrisko mediju sabiedriskais labums*. (2025). SEPLP. p. 62 <https://www.seplp.lv/lv/media/3014/download?attachment>

Monitored Outlets

Outlets for content analysis were selected using relevance sampling. Instead of aiming for a statistically representative sample, the goal of relevance sampling is to select cases that are the most relevant. In this case relevance is determined by the popularity – how many followers does the social media account have. Six outlets targeting Latvia emerge based on this criteria. These are two of the most popular problematic Russian language media Facebook pages for popular Latvia based online news outlets *Baltijas Balss* and *Press*. These are also the most popular Telegram accounts in Russian language, disseminating content about Latvia: *Roslikov*, *Sprats in Exile*, *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics*. Monitored accounts have the highest reach and thus the highest impact on the audiences. Narratives disseminated by them represent what the people in Latvia are exposed to the most.

Baltijas Balss and *Press* are among the 5 most consumed Russian language news outlets in Latvia. Both outlets have similar reach to mainstream, independent, good quality Russian language media outlets. In March 2023 Delfi.Rus had 253 thousand monthly users and *Baltijas Balss* had a comparable audience – 250 thousand users. TVNET.Rus also had similar monthly audience: 245 thousand users. LSM.rus (200 thousand) and *Press* (198 thousand) audiences were smaller, but they still ranked among the top 5 most popular Russian language online news outlets in Latvia.^{vi}

Baltijas Balss and *Press* are unique, because they are media based in Latvia. Before Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both outlets could be described as Kremlin-aligned. Both uncritically reposted content from Kremlin-owned Russia-based media and disseminated Kremlin-aligned narratives.^{vii} After the Russian invasion both outlets expressed strong support for Ukraine and stopped re-publishing stories from Russia based media. Nonetheless, while not openly pro-Kremlin, as this report will show, these outlets continue framing contemporary issues in a problematic way.

- *Baltijas Balss* ownership is unclear. When in 2019 “Vesti” was rebranded to *Baltijas Balss* and sold, the name of new owner was not disclosed. It is only known that the new owner is from Lithuania. The owner of bb.lv domain is SIA Adline which is owned by citizen of Lithuania Sergei Motornij. As this individual has no previous ties with any media, there are worries that he is only a frontman, hiding the real owners.^{viii} *Baltijas Balss* has 68 thousand followers on Facebook.
- Owner of *Press* is 32 years old Andrei Kozlov a member of political party “Stability.” Due to his political affiliations there have been suspicions that *Press* has been doing hidden agitation for “Stability.” Furthermore, the editor-in-chief Konstantin Gaivoronsky has been previously writing for local newspaper “Vesti Segodnya” and has also written for Russia-based media, such as “Vedomosti.”^{ix} *Press* has 41 thousand followers on Facebook.

Most popular problematic Telegram channels:

- *Roslikov* Telegram account is the account of the leader of Stability! political party Aleksejs Rosļikovs. He was expelled from the Harmony party, which historically got most of the

^{vi} *Real User Metrics March 2023*. (n.d.) Gemius Audience. <https://e-public.gemius.com/lv/rankings/10787>
Regrettably, the most recent user data for *Baltijas Balss* is only available until March 2023, as BB.lv ceased sharing their user metrics with Gemius Audience after that date.

^{vii} Hirss, M. (2021). *Kremlin-aligned “media” in Latvia: Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors*. GLOBSEC. p. 4:
<https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/Kremlin-aligned-media-in-Latvia-Kingdom-of-Crooked-Mirrors.pdf>
^{viii} Puriņa, E. (29.12.2019.) *BB.lv – nenotikušās pārmaiņas un atbalsts Sputņikam*. Re:Baltica/Re:Check
<https://rebaltica.lv/2019/12/bb-lv-nenotikusas-parmainas-un-atbalsts-sputnikam/>

^{ix} Litvinoviča, A. (12.07.2024). *Anželika Litvinoviča: Partijas kabatas medija (ne)veiksmes stāsts (precizēts)*. Delfi.
<https://www.delfi.lv/898102/versijas/120033413/anzelika-litvinovica-partijas-kabatas-medija-ne-veiksmes-stasts-precizets>

Russophone electorate vote. In 2019 Rosļikovs created a new party with the goal of taking away Russophone voters from the Harmony party. He succeeded at it and Stability! is currently represented in the Parliament, while Harmony is not. A part of his success was due to his use of TikTok and Telegram.^x In Telegram Rosļikov account has 26 thousand followers.

- *Sprats in Exile* Telegram account is run by Aleksey Stefanov, a former Sputnik journalist. He used to live in Riga, but obtained Russian citizenship and moved to Russia after Sputnik was shut down following EU sanctions against Russia.^{xi} *Sprats in Exile* Telegram account has 10 thousand followers. Its YouTube channel had 57 thousand subscribers, but it has been closed down recently.
- *Baltnews* claims to be “news agency” operating in the Baltic States. However, through a long and complicated chain of ownership it is indirectly owned by the Russian propaganda holding “Rossiya Segodnya.”^{xii} Furthermore, it disseminates Russian propaganda as well as fake content. *Baltnews* Telegram account has 23 thousand followers.
- *Antifascists of Pribaltics* is a Telegram account ran by a group of pro-Russian activists who fled from Latvia to Russia and Belarus. State Security Service has initiated criminal proceedings against these individuals in 2022 due to their glorification and justification of the war in Ukraine by Russia, collection of financial resources and other resources in support of the Russian army of the aggressor country in Ukraine as well as alleged espionage.^{xiii} *Antifascists of Pribaltics* Telegram account has 21 thousand followers.

Data Gathering Methodology

Social media metrics from July 1 to December 31, 2024, were extracted from six monitored outlets using the YouScan social media monitoring tool. The data extraction was completed on December 31, 2024. Current user metrics for specific posts may be slightly higher than reported, as users can continue to engage with older content. This longitudinal study enables the identification of trends and recurring narratives. Typically, new events and developments in Latvia or abroad are not portrayed as unique occurrences. Rather than creating a new narrative for each emerging event, news outlets predominantly tie new events into long-established master narratives that have been constructed over years, if not decades. Consequently, these frequently repeated master narratives become deeply embedded in the consciousness of each outlet's readership.

From all posts within each outlet, the top 100 posts were selected based on two criteria. The first criterion was post popularity. For Telegram channels, popularity was determined by the number of views per post. Unfortunately, Facebook does not provide view counts for individual posts. Therefore, an indirect metric – engagement – was employed instead. Engagement represents the sum of all reactions, comments, and shares a post receives. While this constitutes an imperfect measure of popularity, no better metric for gauging Facebook post popularity is publicly available. This relevance

^x Tetarenko - Supe, A. (28.09.2022.). *No kurienes uzradās Rosļikovs?* Re:Baltica. <https://rebaltica.lv/2022/09/no-kurienes-uzradas-roslikovs/>

^{xi} Sprinģe, I. (28.01. 2025.) *Kremlin Propaganda Revives as 'Neutral' YouTube Channels Amid Claims of Baltic Migration.* Re:Baltica. <https://en.rebaltica.lv/2025/01/kremlin-propaganda-revives-as-neutral-youtube-channels-amid-claims-of-baltic-migration/>

^{xii} Sprinģe, I., Jemberga, S. (6.04.2017.) *Sputnik nezināmais brālis.* Re:Baltica. <https://rebaltica.lv/2017/04/sputnik-nezinamais-bralis/>

^{xiii} VDD. (13.10.2023.) *VDD lūdz sākt kriminālvajāšanu pret sešiem noziedzīgās organizācijas “Baltijas antifasisti” izveidotājiem.* LV portāls. <https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/355951-vdd-ludz-sakt-kriminalvajasanu-pret-sesiem-noziedzigas-organizacijas-baltijas-antifasisti-izveidotajiem-2023>

sampling methodology serves dual analytical purposes: (1) monitoring the content these channels produce, and (2) identifying which narratives resonate most strongly with their audiences. Additionally, focusing on the most popular posts captures a substantial portion of the total views and engagement generated by these outlets. While this approach does not analyze the complete output of each outlet, the sample provides significant insight into the content that resonates the most with their audiences.

The second criterion for post selection involved excluding content about Lithuania and Estonia from the analyzed sample, as this analysis focuses specifically on narratives relevant to Latvian audiences. Based on this criterion (see Table 1), 101 of the most popular posts were initially selected for *Baltijas Balss*, with one post subsequently omitted from the narrative analysis because it concerned other Baltic states. For the *Press* and *Roslikov* accounts, 100 posts each were analyzed. *Sprats in Exile* yielded 125 top posts, with 25 omitted, while 150 posts were selected for *Baltnews* and 135 for *Antifascists of Pribaltics*. The latter three outlets contained a significant number of posts about the other Baltic states. This distribution reflects the different target audiences of these outlets. *Baltijas Balss*, *Press*, and *Roslikov* channels primarily target Russian-speaking audiences in Latvia. In contrast, the other three monitored outlets address audiences across all three Baltic states. Furthermore, since these channels operate from Russia, it is highly probable that some of their followers are also located in Russia.

TABLE 1: Overview of monitored outlets

	Platform, followers	Total posts	% analyzed	Views (TG), Engagement (FB)	% analyzed	Primary audience
Baltijas Balss	FB 68K	1 929	5% (101)	179K	44% (78K)	Latvia
Press	FB 41K	6 398	2% (100)	506K	30% (153K)	Latvia
Roslikov	TG 26K	225	44% (100)	2.1M	51% (1.1M)	Latvia
Sprats in Exile	TG 10K	6 745	2% (125)	14.7M	7% (1.1M)	Baltic States, Russia
Baltnews	TG 23K	5 447	3% (150)	30M	25% (7.5M)	Baltic States, Russia
Antifascists of Pribaltics	TG 21K	1 787	8% (135)	36.3M	66% (23.8M)	Baltic States, Russia

In most monitored outlets except *Roslikov*, the proportion of analyzed posts remains relatively low, representing under 10% of total posts. However, the analyzed posts encompass content that has received substantial views (Telegram) or engagement (Facebook) across all monitored channels (highlighted in Table 1). The share of analyzed views and engagement ranges from 25% for *Baltnews* to a substantial 66% for *Antifascists of Pribaltics*. The sole exception is *Sprats in Exile*, for which only 7% of total views were analyzed as their posts relatively rarely went viral. Nevertheless, this pattern indicates that the majority of views and engagement within five of the six monitored outlets derive from a relatively small number of posts. Consequently, analyzing only the top 100 posts enables valid conclusions about the primary narratives that resonate with audiences across the monitored outlets.

Coding Narratives in Social Network Posts

Narrative, master narrative, sub-narrative and story are terms to describe different levels of storytelling that shape how individuals understand and communicate about social reality. In case of this study, the story is the content of one specific post. It can be text, a news article, video or image which was linked to or embedded into the post. Methodologically, each post (story) was coded according to narrative(s) and sub-narratives present in it. The coding was determined based on three analytical criteria: (1) topic (for example, posts about increased costs of everyday goods were coded under the Cost of Living sub-narrative); (2) content (post about Joe Biden falling asleep was coded under the Weak West sub-narrative as it portrayed the US President as weak and comical); and (3) specific keywords (posts explicitly about “Russophobia” were coded under the narrative of the same name). This methodology enabled the classification of posts across the six monitored outlets into clear, comparable categories.

Narrative organizes information into interpretive frameworks that help people make sense of the world. A narrative is a coherent, overarching explanation of events and facts that creates meaning through their connection and progression. It is a powerful tool that shapes perception, identity, and behaviour.

Master Narrative refers to an overarching story that dominates social understanding within a social group, culture or society. These are broad, widely-shared narratives that provide frameworks for understanding large social processes.

Sub-narrative is a component or branch of a master narrative that focuses on a specific aspect or theme within the larger framework. Sub-narratives maintain coherence with and reinforce the master narrative but emphasize particular elements or interpretations.

Story is the most concrete and specific level. Stories are particular instances or examples that illustrate narratives. While narratives are abstract patterns, stories provide specific characters, settings, and events. Stories are the building blocks that construct and reinforce broader narratives. Individual stories (posts) gain power and resonance with audience when they align with pre-established narratives.

These three elements of communication and storytelling function within a hierarchical structure. Master narratives establish broad conceptual frameworks. Sub-narratives elaborate on specific components of those frameworks. Individual stories provide concrete examples that make abstract concepts more relatable and persuasive. This hierarchy clarifies how social meaning is constructed, communicated, and reinforced across monitored outlets. The coding approach used in this research also reflects this three-tiered hierarchical structure. Each post (story) was coded based on the sub-narrative and corresponding master narrative it contained.^{xiv}

This paper is also organized to follow that framework. Each following section systematically identifies and examines a distinct master narrative that emerged from the analyzed social media content. Each section then explores the underlying sub-narratives, providing detailed descriptions of their characteristics, themes, and rhetorical strategies. Additionally, each outline of sub-narrative includes the overview of stories that support and reinforce it, illustrating how abstract narrative frameworks are expressed through concrete social media posts. This structure ensures comprehensive coverage of the narrative ecosystem while maintaining clarity and coherence throughout the report.

^{xiv} You can find a detailed breakdown of narrative coding across all monitored posts in the accompanying Excel file: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13arSC_f2EbGSX4mpaQA5TLvQCqE3PvhN/

Key Findings

The top 100 posts from each outlet offer a distinctive view of both the outlet’s content and its audience (see Table 2 for details and Attachment 1 for a more nuanced breakdown). These results highlight both the outputs and outcomes of each outlet’s activity. Outputs refer to the stories and narratives that the outlet produces and publishes. Outcomes reflect audience response – measured by the most engaged-with posts on Facebook and the most viewed content on Telegram. This study reveals not only what these outlets publish, but more importantly, what content resonates most with their audiences.

One of the most noteworthy findings is that, although there were 347 posts containing narratives across the monitored outlets, the majority of these posts featured only a few recurring narratives. Most of these posts could be categorized under four dominant master narratives: (1) Russophobia; (2) Economic Hardships; (3) Failed State; and (4) Bad West. Posts with these narratives usually are highly emotionally charged, which enables posts containing them to capture the audience’s attention. At the same time, it is likely that these master narratives have become internalized as common sense among the audiences, who actively seek out such posts to confirm their preexisting biases.

Each of these master narratives contains multiple sub-narratives, which the following sections of this report explore in detail. In addition to the master narratives, two minor narratives appeared in the content of some monitored outlets. The Decadent Liberal Values narrative surfaced occasionally across several outlets, while the Supporting Russia in War narrative was present in only two of the monitored outlets – *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics*. Beyond these more prominent narratives, a small number of posts featured other, isolated narratives that appeared only once or a few times. Since they played a minor role, these narratives are not examined in depth in this report.

TABLE 2: Number of posts containing specific narrative within each monitored outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics
Russophobia	11	19	19	24	17	20
Economic Hardships	8	16	8	2	3	5
Failed State	5	5	38	8	7	11
Bad West	0	0	5	9	28	36
Decadent Liberal Values	2	3	8	0	0	3
Supporting Russia in War	0	0	0	0	9	13
Other narrative	0	3	0	10	1	11
Total of posts with narratives ^{xv}	26	44	69	49	63	96

Each outlet offers a different flavor and there exists a spectrum of narratives across monitored outlets (see Attachment 2: Most popular master and sub-narrative for each monitored outlet). *Baltijas Balss* and *Press* often tie into real stories about Russophobia and Economic hardships. However, *Roslikov*, *Sprats in Exile* and especially *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics* offer increasingly more radical narratives. Latter outlet – *Antifascists of Pribaltics* – is the most emotionally charged, using strongest language, for example, regularly throwing in accusations of Nazism within many of its posts.

^{xv} The total number of posts may differ from the narrative count above, as some posts contain multiple narratives.

Narrative: Russophobia in Latvia

One of the three most resonant narratives among the most popular posts in the six monitored outlets was about alleged **Russophobia in Latvia** – a strong, irrational dislike towards Russians, Russian culture, and language. Some of the monitored outlets even occasionally use the term “Russophobia” explicitly in their posts, but mostly, the alleged Russophobia is implied. Posts containing this narrative highlight the experiences of Russian speakers facing prejudice and discrimination in various aspects of life. However, there exists a spectrum of sub-narratives within this master narrative.

Sub-narratives:

Latvians Harass Russian Speakers – Portrays everyday discrimination against Russian speakers by presenting incidents where Latvians allegedly mistreat them, creating an image of increasing ethnolinguistic tensions.

Government Discriminates Russophones – Criticizes Latvian government policies, such as monument removals, street name changes, and education reform requiring Latvian-only instruction, as manifestations of discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.

Persecution of Russian Speakers – Claims that Russian speakers face active persecution in Latvia, using emotionally charged language, exaggerations, and false claims to portray the government and Latvian nationalists as seeking to eradicate Russians, their language, and their culture.

The Russophobia narrative was present in all monitored outlets to a relatively similar extent. However, there were differences between the outlets (see Table 3). *Sprats in Exile* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics* emphasized the most radical sub-narrative – Persecution of Russian Speakers. *Press* and *Baltijas Balss* were more moderate – this most radical sub-narrative did not appear in the most popular Facebook content of either outlet.

TABLE 3: Number of posts containing Russophobia narratives within each outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics
Russophobia narratives total	11	19	19	24	17	20
- Latvians Harass Russian Speakers	8	11	4	0	3	3
- Government Discriminates Russophones	3	8	8	11	10	3
- Persecution of Russian Speakers	0	0	7	13	3	10
- Other Russophobia narratives	0	0	0	0	1	4

Sub-narrative: **Latvians Harass Russian speakers**

The most popular posts in the monitored outlets presented a narrative of Russian speakers feeling persecuted and marginalized in Latvia. This narrative was especially dominant among the most popular Facebook posts of the outlets *Baltijas Balss* and *Press*. Both outlets reported extensively on instances

where Latvians demanded that Russians speak Latvian or even refused service if they did not speak Latvian in buses,¹ taxis,² concerts,³ and shops.⁴ This narrative often reflected deeply rooted, emotional resentment among Russophones: “If I speak Russian, then I am not a human.”⁵ These posts mostly reported on the experiences of Russian speakers living in Latvia, predominantly shared on social media. Alternatively, posts with this narrative relied on describing social media entries where Latvians were outraged by the use of the Russian language, such as in a store⁶ or by a neighbour.⁷ These posts were based on real events or real posts on social media, addressing a real problem in Latvia. However, they tended to paint an exaggerated and one-sided, highly negative perspective of Latvia as riddled with ethnic tensions and conflict between both ethnolinguistic communities.

Latvian Harass Russian Speakers example

Excerpt

“Scandal on the bus: the driver demands the passenger to speak Latvian.”⁸

4th most engaged post in **Baltijas Balss**

Reactions: **846**

Comments: **2712**

Shares: **112**

Reactions

The majority of commentators criticized the bus driver and supported the woman. For some, this story resonated with their own experiences: “This happens everywhere... this idiocy, malice, and hatred only cause a rejection towards Latvians.” Others criticized Latvian nationalists, claiming they “are going crazy with hatred.” One comment observed that these tensions were new: “We lived for 30 years without quarrelling, and then patriotism came from all the holes.” Some comments even claimed that Nazism is on the rise in Latvia.

Manipulations

This and other similar posts used **selective reporting** – presenting one-sided, biased information and highlighting incidents that support their narrative. They also relied on **stereotypes and generalizations**, extrapolating from one or a few incidents to claim that all Latvians are extreme and hateful. This creates a skewed perception of reality, where the discrimination of Russian speakers is depicted as ubiquitous and systematic, without addressing the other side of the story.

Many posts displayed a tone of **resentment and bitterness** towards the Latvian government, its policies, and Latvian speakers. Overall, the emotional tone of these posts is charged with negativity, portraying a deep sense of grievance, fear, and polarization within Latvian society. These posts aimed to cultivate an **us-versus-them mentality**, portraying Latvian speakers and authorities as hostile oppressors and Russian speakers as victims, thereby creating a sense of solidarity among Russian speakers while demonizing the opposing side.

All six monitored outlets covered statements coming from “de-Russify Latvia” campaign activists,⁹ albeit for *Baltijas Balss* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics* these posts were not among the top 100 posts included in the monitoring. The leader of this campaign Liana Langa,¹⁰ who is a politician from party National Alliance, previously from party Conservatives, received a special attention from these outlets. For example, *Press* reported¹¹ on a Facebook post by Langa where she reported on an alleged incident: “Trash collectors... next to my home were shouting in the language of occupants. Morning started with Russianness (krievēlību - derogatory). We shouldn’t be listening to Russian screechers (bļauros - derogatory).”¹² The *Press* article shared in the Facebook post correctly concluded that the Law on the State Language does not apply to informal communication between residents of Latvia, highlighting that there is no legal basis for Langa’s demands.

Baltnews also reported on statements from Latvian nationalists. For example, they used a quote from ex-politician from party Conservatives Andris Vītols who supported statement of a campsite: “We do not serve dogs, Russians and Belarusians.”¹³ *Baltnews* labelled this and similar incidents as “Russophobia” and even used this term even as a self-evident without any explanation.¹⁴ In another post *Baltnews* concluded: “The Latvian authorities have long turned a blind eye to the attacks from local “de-Russifiers” against Russian-speakers, and in the past two years, even the most radical statements have become permissible.”¹⁵

While these are **cherry-picked posts** from social media, which highlight only one perspective, these are real social media posts which reflect a real sentiment towards Russophone community that exists among Latvians. Attitudes expressed in these posts made by Latvians range from negatively emotionally charged to hate speech. These posts covering instances of in person and online harassment and hate speech directed towards Russian speakers use **emotional appeals** to mobilize their audience. They usually quote the hateful statements, use emotionally charged language and vivid descriptions to evoke feelings of anger, fear, resentment, and injustice among Russian speakers. However, emotional appeals are also often used to sway the reader in many of the posts containing other identified narratives.

Sub-narrative: **Government Discriminates Russophones**

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the previous two coalition governments implemented a series of policies targeting Latvia's Russian-speaking community. The National Alliance, the primary architects of these policies, framed them as necessary measures to enhance national security and overcome the negative legacy of the Soviet era. However, the most popular posts in the monitored outlets chose not to report on the reasons why the new policies were deemed necessary. Instead, they portrayed these policies as Russophobic, revanchist, discriminatory, and undemocratic.

This narrative can be summarized by the quote from *Press*: “The fight against the Russian language in the public space is becoming more and more fierce.”¹⁶ The proof of this, according to *Baltijas Balss* and *Press* during the monitoring period, was the aforementioned “de-Russify Latvia” campaign, the education reform, the “epidemic of renaming” streets,¹⁷ and the dismantling of Soviet- and Russia-affiliated monuments.¹⁸ These policies were usually not explained but are labelled as irrationally Russophobic. For example, *Sprats in Exile* covered the demolition of monuments ironically commenting that also “the Vanšu bridge, Academy of Sciences, and other significant objects should be removed in Riga” as they were built during the Soviet period.¹⁹ This framed the removal of some monuments and renaming of some streets as arbitrary and irrational.

The education reform in minority schools was also framed negatively. As of September 2023, Latvia began phasing out its bilingual education system in minority schools. By September 2025, all education will be conducted exclusively in Latvian, ending the Soviet-era practice of separate, so-called “Russian” schools. The monitored outlets characterized the reform as “raw... carried out without proper preparation,”²⁰ occasionally even hinting that this is an attempt to eradicate the Russian language.²¹ They also emphasized the difficulties children face with this reform, alleging that “the complete rejection of the mother tongue can greatly undermine the teenager,”²² and that some children are struggling to fit into the new system, with one child feeling like “a stranger” in the class because he did not understand Latvian.²³ While these outlets frame the education reform in a negative light, this is a legitimate perspective based on real problems.

The State Education Quality Service has identified significant challenges with the transition to exclusively Latvian-language education. Monitoring of the transition in 134 minority schools from September 2023 to February 2024 concluded that in 43% of schools, the transition was either insufficient or needed improvement. Four schools did not use Latvian in some of the classes that were supposed to be conducted in Latvian. Additionally, 22% of the monitored schools had pupils who were unable to learn in Latvian due to insufficient Latvian language skills. Furthermore, 87 teachers in the monitored schools had inadequate Latvian language skills and were unable to teach in Latvian.^{xvi} This long-overdue reform is facing substantial implementation hurdles. While the monitored outlets do not explain why this policy is necessary, they do cover legitimate concerns raised by parents, as well as real problems with the implementation of this reform.

Sub-narrative: **Persecution of Russian Speakers**

While *Press* and *Baltijas Balss* primarily focused on human stories about Russophones facing discrimination in Latvia, other monitored outlets employed a more extreme sub-narrative. These outlets portrayed government policies and Latvians not merely as discriminating against Russian speakers, but as actively persecuting them through deliberate efforts to eradicate Russian language and culture. Beyond making blatantly false claims, posts with this sub-narrative used **emotionally charged language, exaggerations, and hyperbole** to amplify the perceived injustice and danger.


Roslikov's Telegram account employed more charged language and blamed the Latvian government and nationalists in posts containing Russophobia narratives. He claimed that the government “crushes our Russian-speaking people”²⁴ while falsely asserting that “Today, two gays in Latvia have more rights than a Russian-speaking person! Russians and Belarusians cannot be persecuted in Latvia!”²⁵ Roslikov specifically targeted “turbo-patriots” who “are waging a tireless struggle against Russian speakers”²⁶ or “NACBLOK” within the Parliament, which he claimed wants “Russian speakers to suffer, preferably every day.”²⁷ This was considerably stronger language compared to the previous two sub-narratives

Sprats in Exile disseminated very similar ideas. They concluded that “Latvian authorities would gladly get rid of all Russians.”²⁸ Government is “mercilessly rewriting history”²⁹ and the real aim of education reform is to “eradicate Russian” language.³⁰ Sprats also focused on Latvian nationalists, who allegedly “are already actually calling for the extermination of the Russian residents of Latvia.”³¹ To further this

^{xvi} *Vienotas skolas pieeja vairumā izvērtēto izglītības iestāžu tiek īstenota labi.* (2024, March 12). State Education Quality Service. <https://www.ikvd.gov.lv/lv/jaunums/vienotas-skolas-pieeja-vairuma-izverteto-izglitibas-iestazu-tiek-istenota-labi>

narrative, this channel also republished statements from Russian government claiming that “the discriminatory requirements of Latvia’s migration legislation are openly Russophobic... violating fundamental international legal norms”³² and that Latvia is “harassing” Russians.³³

However, *Sprats in Exile* took this sub-narrative much further by falsely claiming that there are “mass imprisonments” of Russians who are imprisoned for no reason.³⁴ They featured interviews with individuals who have fled Latvia after what they claim is political persecution.³⁵ This outlet covered cases of pro-Kremlin radicals and journalists working for Sputnik, who have been sentenced in Latvia for violating EU sanctions,³⁶ while claiming that “The President of Latvia puts pressure on the court to toughen the sentences” in cases against Russian speakers.³⁷ Posts like these added a much darker spin to this sub-narrative.



While most of these posts were exaggerated and disconnected from reality, the outlets occasionally presented cherry-picked real evidence to support their claims. For example, *Sprats in Exile* highlighted a social media poll where a Latvian user had asked: “Would you like to exterminate Russians in Latvia?” with 31% of respondents answering affirmatively (see the image to the left).³⁸ This represented a genuine instance of rhetoric promoting violence against the Russophone community.

In the spectrum of Russophobia narratives, the *Antifascists of Pribaltika* Telegram channel employed the most emotionally charged language, frequently using **irony, sarcasm, dark humor, and cynicism**. One post posed the question: “Why do Latvians hate Russians?”³⁹ Multiple posts utilized satirical commentary, for example: “The entire Latvian public is shocked. The world will never be the same again,”⁴⁰ mocking reactions to a Russian-language song being included in a music school’s Christmas concert. This channel similarly claimed that persecution of Russophones without justification is widespread in Latvia: “In order to be prosecuted for treason..., it is enough just to speak and write in Russian and respect your Fatherland, culture, history.”⁴¹ This portrayal of Russophone treatment provided context for the channel’s jokes about supposed Nazism in Latvia. Overall, the outrage about alleged persecution was primarily directed toward what these outlets portrayed as the absurd extremes of the Latvian government’s de-Russification efforts.

While occasionally referencing genuine instances of discriminatory rhetoric, the monitored channels consistently misrepresented government policies, judicial proceedings, and educational reforms as deliberate efforts to suppress Russian language and culture. These outlets relied on exaggeration, selective reporting, cherry-picking, one-sided stories, and emotional appeals. This persecution narrative served to deepen societal divisions, undermine trust in Latvian institutions, sow discord within Latvian society, and justify the Russian government’s claims of “Russophobia” in the Baltic region.

Narrative: Economic Hardships

Another set of narratives focuses on **Economic Hardships** in Latvia. These narratives portray Latvia as suffering from severe economic problems that leave ordinary citizens struggling while enriching the elites. Although these outlets tend to cherry-pick negative stories, use emotional appeals, and exaggerate, most of the posts tap into and amplify real economic issues. Posts with this narrative are among the most popular in the monitored outlets, likely because it resonates with the daily experiences of many Russophones who have faced significant inflation and feel economically worse off.

Sub-narratives:

Rising Costs of Living – Highlights the growing prices of everyday goods and services in Latvia, while underscoring that salaries and pensions remain insufficiently low and claiming this disparity has led to widespread frustration and discontent among citizens.

Economic Decline – Depicts Latvia as undergoing widespread economic deterioration, with examples such as business closures, deteriorating infrastructure, and declining industries, occasionally suggesting that conditions were better during the Soviet era.

Government Economic Mismanagement – Attributes Latvia’s economic challenges to government incompetence and corruption, alleging that politicians are enriching themselves while ordinary citizens continue to struggle financially.

This narrative was more pronounced in outlets specifically targeting audiences only in Latvia – *Baltijas Balss*, *Press* and *Roslikov* (see Table 4). However, each of the monitored outlets emphasized a different aspect of the narrative. This narrative was most prevalent in the *Press*, with 16% of the monitored posts within this outlet containing it. *Press* focused primarily on the Economic Decline aspect of the narrative. Meanwhile, *Baltijas Balss* highlighted the Rising Costs of Living (8% of posts), while the *Roslikov* Telegram channel took a different approach, predominantly criticizing Government Economic Mismanagement (also 8%). These narratives were less prominent in the other three monitored outlets.

TABLE 4: Number of posts containing Economic Hardship narratives within each outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics
Economic Hardships narratives total	8	16	8	2	3	5
- Rising Costs of Living	8	1	0	0	0	1
- Economic Decline	0	10	0	2	2	3
- Government Economic Mismanagement	0	4	8	0	1	1
- Other Economy narratives	0	1	0	0	0	0

Sub-narrative: **Rising Costs of Living**

A significant narrative revolved around the increasing cost of living. This sub-narrative was predominantly covered in *Baltijas Balss*. Posts containing this narrative provided a multitude of examples, such as the high prices in Old Riga cafés and restaurants,⁴² as well as the rising costs of natural gas,⁴³ butter,⁴⁴ potatoes,⁴⁵ and fuel.⁴⁶ The latter two are allegedly the most expensive in the Baltic States. At the same time, pensions⁴⁷ and salaries⁴⁸ in Latvia were characterized as inadequately low. These posts expressed shock, frustration, and dismay at the rising costs of living. Overall, the narrative emphasized the growing financial strain faced by Latvian citizens.

This narrative addresses a real issue that people in Latvia are facing. Inflation in Latvia grew by 35% from December 2020 to May 2023. Although inflation has increased by only 3.5 percentage points from then until February 2025,^{xvii} people continue to live with significantly higher prices, while the growth in salaries and old-age pensions has not kept pace with the inflation rate. Furthermore, the long-term, second-order effects of inflation, such as business closures and price volatility for certain products, are still ongoing. This explains the popularity of these economy-related narratives, as they tap into real issues that affect the daily lives of people who follow the monitored channels.

Sub-narrative: **Economic Decline**

The posts containing this sub-narrative expressed concern over the decline and closure of various industries and businesses. Examples included the closure of the meat pavilion at Riga Central Market,⁴⁹ the disappearance of “Liepāja Coffee” from stores,⁵⁰ Siemens laying off workers,⁵¹ the liquidation of sock manufacturer “Aurora Baltika” in Daugavpils,⁵² and others. Infrastructure, particularly bridges, was also portrayed as deteriorating.⁵³ Similarly, cargo transit via rail and ports was depicted as in decline.⁵⁴ All of these examples contributed to portraying Latvia as undergoing economic decline. In addition, some posts suggested that the government is to blame for this, while others claimed that the economy during the Soviet occupation was better.

Posts containing these narratives are likely to receive high engagement from Russophone followers of the monitored outlets, as these narratives reflect their daily experiences. The Latgale region, where half of the population are Russophones, has been stagnating since the 2008 Great Recession. Latgale is not only the poorest region in the Baltics but also among the poorest in the entire EU. In March 2025, the unemployment rate in Latgale was 11.4%, while the average unemployment rate in Latvia was only 5.5%.^{xviii} The average after-tax salary in Latgale for Q4 2024 was EUR 937, more than EUR 300 less than the national average of EUR 1,259.^{xix} Similarly, the districts of Riga with the lowest income levels^{xx} are predominantly inhabited by Russophones.

^{xvii} *Inflācijas kalkulators. Decembris 2020 – Februāris. 2025.* (n.d.) Centrālā statistikas pārvalde. https://tools.csb.gov.lv/cpi_calculator/lv/2020M12-2025M03/0/100

^{xviii} *Unemployment statistics* (31.03.2024). State Employment Agency. <https://www.nva.gov.lv/en/unemployment-statistics-1>

^{xix} *Strādājošo mēneša vidējā darba samaksa reģionos (eiro) – Bruto/ Neto.* (n.d.). Oficiālais statistikas portāls. https://data.stat.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/OSP_PUB/START_EMP_DS_DSV/DSV041c/

^{xx} *Vislabāk atalgoti ir rīdzinieki Skanstē, Ķīpsalā un Vecpilsētā.* (26.09.2024). Oficiālais statistikas portāls. <https://stat.gov.lv/lv/statistikas-temas/darbs/alga/preses-relizes/24267-menesa-videja-darba-samaksa-rigas-apkaimes>

Economic Decline example

Excerpt

"Today, the Latvian language is considered the national treasure of Latvia, while in the past, the main riches were the pines and climate of Jūrmala."⁵⁵

5th most engaged post in **Press**

Reactions: **2578**

Comments: **1232**

Shares: **468**

Reactions

Most commentators agreed to the post. Some echoed Soviet nostalgia. A few criticized the government, asking, "30 years of independence have passed. What has prevented us from developing and becoming prosperous?" Others criticized Latvians for losing the tourism industry, saying, "Everything is going according to plan. The Latvians are happy with everything, while the EU is throwing them bones."

Manipulations

This post used **loaded, emotional language**: "Local oligarchs only dream of how to snatch a fatter piece in the dunes of Jūrmala. But they could invest in the health resorts..." Furthermore, these posts frequently **hint at, rather than directly express**, certain ideas. For example, the message in this post was that things used to be better (Economic Decline sub-narrative), but it also subtly implied that the government, which prioritizes Latvian language over the economy, is to blame for this (Government Economic Mismanagement).

Sub-narrative: **Government Economic Mismanagement**

The aforementioned sub-narratives were closely tied to criticism of the government and political elites. This sub-narrative was most pronounced in the *Roslikov* Telegram channel, while other channels usually only implied it. *Roslikov* directly criticized the mismanagement in the Riga City Council⁵⁶ and the government's decision to "write off" financial support for the AirBaltic company.⁵⁷ In other posts, he accused politicians of earning unreasonably high salaries,⁵⁸ which they recently increased, while ordinary people continue to struggle financially.⁵⁹ *Roslikov* even falsely claimed that the government of Latvia is concealing its "bankruptcy," adding that Latvia is not a viable state and cannot survive on its own: "Without subsidies from Europe, we are finished!"⁶⁰ However, other monitored outlets also disseminated this narrative using exaggerations. For example, *Baltnews* used the decline in cargo transit following the implementation of sanctions against Russia and Belarus to ironically conclude that "Latvian authorities are finishing off the country's economy."⁶¹ In summary, these posts reflect a widespread sentiment of dissatisfaction with government policies, portraying the Latvian government and political elites as responsible for the country's economic struggles.

Narrative: Failed State

Many posts within the monitored channels were highly critical of the government in the broadest sense, painting a picture of Latvia as a **Failed State**. These outlets weaved together several interconnected narratives to portray Latvia as dysfunctional, corrupt, and in decline. The government was depicted as fundamentally incompetent and corrupt, unable to manage state affairs or address pressing national issues. The most radical version of this narrative portrayed Latvia as a collapsing nation: depopulated, deindustrialized, and with a failing economy.

Sub-narratives:

Incompetent Government – Portrays Latvia’s government as incapable of solving real problems, mocking leadership figures, and highlighting policy failures and infrastructure issues to paint a picture of systemic dysfunction and collapse.

Government Economic Mismanagement (covered in previous page) – Attributes Latvia’s economic problems to government incompetence and corruption, hence combining two master narratives: Economic Hardship and Failed State.

Corrupt and Self-Serving Government – Depicts government as corrupt elites enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary citizens, creating a populist divide between “the people” and a self-serving political elite.

While all monitored outlets contained narratives critical of the Latvian government, these narratives were predominantly disseminated by the *Roslikov* Telegram account, making up 36% of monitored posts (see Table 5). As the leader of the opposition party Stability!, Roslikov disseminates these narratives to discredit the coalition government, thereby benefiting his party. These narratives also contribute to creating a populist elites-vs-people interpretation of politics, allowing Roslikov to position himself as the defender of the people against the corrupt and self-serving government and elites.

TABLE 5: Number of posts containing Failed State narratives within each outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics
Failed State narratives total	5	5	36	8	7	11
Incompetent Government	5	1	6	3	4	4
Government Economic Mismanagement	0	4	8	0	1	1
Corrupt and Self-Serving Government	0	0	23	2	0	1
Other anti-government narratives	0	0	1	3	2	5

Sub-narrative: **Incompetent Government**

This narrative portrays the Latvian government as incompetent and incapable of addressing real problems. For example, Prime Minister Evika Siliņa is described in derogatory terms as an “elite escort and a failed star”⁶² who “does not think.”⁶³ Posts advancing this narrative often highlight problematic

infrastructure projects, such as parts of a newly built sports arena already “falling apart,”⁶⁴ the malfunctioning of new ViVi trains,⁶⁵ and the mismanagement of the Rail Baltica project.⁶⁶ Criticism extended beyond infrastructure, targeting a wide range of government policies. Sanctions against Russia and Belarus were depicted as being implemented haphazardly.⁶⁷ Compulsory military service was blamed for prompting emigration,⁶⁸ and Latvia was described as “a conveyor belt for the rehabilitation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”⁶⁹ Through these interconnected themes, the monitored outlets construct a broader narrative in which the government is portrayed as fundamentally dysfunctional and unable to govern effectively.

The five most radical posts clearly depicted Latvia as a failed state. They highlighted low public confidence in the country’s future, citing an opinion poll showing that less than half of residents see their future in Latvia.⁷⁰ One post claimed that the country is “deindustrialized and depopulated,”⁷¹ while another ironically featured an image of an empty street in Riga to suggest the same.⁷² These interconnected themes, repeated across various Telegram channels, collectively contribute to a broader narrative portraying Latvia as a failing or already failed state.

Incompetent Government example

Excerpt

“Don't laugh - we have 2nd place! ...Riga took 2nd place in the list of the best cities in the world for walking.”⁷³

62nd most engaged post in **Press**

Reactions: **608**

Comments: **256**

Shares: **22**

Reactions

People in the comments section vehemently disagreed with and mocked the post. Some labeled the claim as “nonsense” and posted critical remarks about Riga. Commenters complained that Riga lacks toilets and trash cans, is expensive and only affordable for the rich, has poor-quality roads, is devoid of people, and is filled with “bums and garbage.”

Manipulations

The post on Facebook, as well as the story, was based on a **real article** from an investing website Insider Monkey. The only manipulation was the **subtle suggestion** to the audience “not to laugh.” However, even without such subtle hints, positive stories that seem **too good to be true** often provoke significant backlash from the audiences of Press and Baltijas Balss. Most commentators perceived the story as a joke or assumed the author was incompetent, with one remarking, “Who decided this was either blind... or drunk?” This highlights how **deeply embedded the negative attitudes and beliefs** are among the audiences of both outlets. All information presented to followers is filtered through this negative lens.

Sub-narrative: **Corrupt and Self-Serving Government**

These posts advanced a narrative portraying Latvia's government as deeply corrupt and self-serving, failing ordinary citizens. This populist sub-narrative dividing elites vs. the people predominantly came from the *Roslikov* Telegram channel. As the leader of the political party Stability!, he uses this narrative to criticize his political opponents. While he primarily targets members of other parties, he occasionally criticizes specific governmental bodies or the government as a whole.

These posts repeatedly highlighted alleged political hypocrisy, citing examples of officials increasing their own salaries while citizens struggle economically,⁷⁴ ministers enjoying luxurious services like personal waiters at meetings,⁷⁵ while taking away the food from the poor,⁷⁶ and politicians “pumping people’s money into the accounts of their families.”⁷⁷ One post even invoked a conspiracy theory, claiming that the “Unity party has seized the country” while establishing “cosmically huge” salaries for government officials to ensure their loyalty.⁷⁸ There were also calls to “imprison all politicians who rob people.”⁷⁹ The messaging depicts a stark division between “the system” and “the people,”⁸⁰ positioning Roslikov and his party as fighters against a corrupt majority in parliament.

Roslikov’s populist strategy

Roslikov Telegram channels uses Failed State narratives the most compared to all monitored outlets. Roslikov’s use of this narrative exemplifies a classic populist strategy by crafting a narrative that divides society into two antagonistic groups: the elite political class and the people. This is a core tenet of populism, which thrives on portraying a corrupt, out-of-touch elite ruling over an oppressed and disenfranchised populace. The reasoning behind this strategy is to foster a sense of us-versus-them, tapping into the frustrations and grievances of ordinary citizens who feel neglected or mistreated by the political system. By presenting the government and political elites as corrupt, self-serving, and disconnected from the real struggles of the population, Roslikov positions himself and his party as the true representatives of the people, standing in opposition to the established, corrupt order.

This strategy often stirs **anger and resentment**, mobilizing the public against perceived elites. However, it is not the only tool in this communication. The use of **conspiracy theories**, such as the claim that the “Unity party has seized the country” to enrich itself,⁸¹ is another hallmark of populism, serving to further delegitimize political opponents and present them as part of an illegitimate power structure. Finally, the **emotionally loaded calls** to “imprison all politicians who rob people”⁸² intensify the populist rhetoric, framing the opposition as not just politically corrupt, but morally and legally culpable. This further legitimizes the populist movement by portraying it as a righteous crusade against entrenched corruption. In sum, Roslikov’s narrative is a textbook example of populist rhetoric designed to create a sense of moral urgency, foster division, and galvanize support for his political agenda.

While Roslikov employs a classic populist strategy by portraying a corrupt elite versus the common people, he adds a distinctive twist by positioning himself specifically as the defender of the Russian-speaking segment of society. He blends economic and political grievances with Russophobia narratives, frequently accusing the government and Latvian nationalists of discriminating against or even persecuting Russophones. His Telegram posts often use **inflammatory language**, portraying Russian speakers as oppressed, marginalized, and unfairly targeted. The image Roslikov constructs is one in which the government is not only incapable of governing effectively but is actively hostile toward Russian speakers, while he alone stands as their true protector in Latvia.

Narrative: Bad West

Another set of narratives focuses on the multitude of reasons **why the West is bad**. Posts with these narratives criticize the EU, UN, NATO, the US, as well as other Western countries and institutions. They depict the West as both aggressive in its hostility toward Russia and weak due to its hollow values, declining global influence, and waning capabilities. While this characterization is contradictory, it reinforces a narrative critical of Western countries and institutions. This serves to undermine Western credibility while positioning Russia as both a victim of Western aggression and ultimately superior to the allegedly declining Western powers.

Sub-narratives:

Aggressive West – Portrays NATO and Western countries, particularly the United States and the European Union, as irrationally Russophobic and belligerent aggressors preparing for war against Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy and the Baltic states as a staging ground.

Hypocritical West – Highlights alleged contradictions between Western values and actions, portraying Western powers as not genuinely democratic, morally inconsistent, and secretly harbouring Nazi sympathies.

Weak West – Depicts Western powers and international organizations as declining in influence and effectiveness, with insufficient military capabilities and an inability to address global challenges effectively.

The Bad West narratives were predominantly present in *Antifascists of Pribaltics* (36% of monitored posts within the outlet) and *Baltnews* (28%), and occasionally in *Roslikovs* (5%) and *Sprats in Exile* (5%) accounts (see Table 6). This narrative was not present among the top posts of *Baltijas Balss* and *Press*. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both outlets began to omit coverage of international events, a subject they had previously covered extensively through Kremlin-aligned lens.^{xxi} It is likely that both outlets have reduced coverage of international events due to changes in Latvian laws in April 2022, which prohibit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

TABLE 6: Number of posts containing The Bad West narratives within each outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics
The Bad West narratives total	0	0	5	5	28	36
- Aggressive West	0	0	2	6	13	20
- Hypocritical West	0	0	1	2	8	7
- Weak West	0	0	1	0	7	2
- Other West narratives	0	0	1	0	0	7

^{xxi} Hirss, M. (2021). *Kremlin-aligned “media” in Latvia: Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors*. GLOBSEC. Retrieved from: <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/Kremlin-aligned-media-in-Latvia-Kingdom-of-Crooked-Mirrors.pdf>

Sub-narrative: **Aggressive West**

Multiple posts frequently portrayed Western countries as aggressors intent on harming Russia. The EU,⁸³ USA,⁸⁴ NATO,⁸⁵ Poland⁸⁶ or “Anglo-Saxons”⁸⁷ were alleged to be preparing for war with Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy⁸⁸ or the Baltic States as a beachhead for invasion.⁸⁹ Occasionally, these posts even claimed that Russia and the West are engaged in a “third world war,” with NATO “no longer waging a hybrid war,” but “practically an open one.”⁹⁰ NATO was often discussed in *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics*, for example, with claims that military exercises in the Baltic region are not mere training operations but preparations for an invasion of Russia.⁹¹ The security concerns of the Baltic States were ridiculed, dismissed, and framed as irrationally aggressive.⁹² These outlets also mocked Western support for Ukraine, comparing it to “giving a grenade to a monkey.”⁹³ Such portrayals aim to discredit the west by strengthening the narrative of a West bent on hostility toward Russia among the followers of these outlets.

At the same time, the West was portrayed as irrationally Russophobic and planning to forbid Russians to speak Russian.⁹⁴ The Baltic States were depicted as being controlled or even “occupied”⁹⁵ by the West, acting against their own interests by promoting anti-Russian policies.⁹⁶ Multiple posts framed the Baltic States as aggressors, or as being used by the West for aggression. These posts falsely claimed that there are “constant provocations”⁹⁷ on Russia’s Baltic borders, such as planes violating Russian airspace,⁹⁸ and even “NATO drone attacks” in Russia, allegedly launched from the Baltic States⁹⁹ or Finland.¹⁰⁰ Overall, these posts often employed an “us vs. them” dichotomy, portraying the West as the irrational aggressor and Russia as an innocent victim.

Aggressive West example

Excerpt

“Collection of signatures has begun for an appeal to NATO¹⁰¹ allies to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Latvia.”

11th most engaged post in **Antifascists of Pribaltics**

Views: **264 160**

Reactions: **279**

Comments: **10**

Shares: **248**

Reactions

People in the comments section called the author of this initiative an “idiot,” described the proposal as “inhumane,” claimed that the U.S. was probably actually behind the initiative, or agreed that Russia would retaliate.

Manipulations

This post used **emotional language** and a **slippery slope** fallacy. It characterized the proposed signature-gathering initiative as “collective suicide” while suggesting that this step would lead to a Russian nuclear strike on Latvia: “The Latvian public throws bonnets into the air in delight and applauds furiously. The air is filled with joyful anticipation and lust. No one disperses. Everyone looks at the sky. They are waiting for it to arrive...”

Sub-narrative: **Hypocritical West**

Posts in this sub-narrative highlighted examples of alleged Western hypocrisy and moral inconsistency. Some of these posts were based on real or partially real issues. For instance, Trump's proposals for Canada to become a U.S. state, and his threat to take control of Panama and Greenland,¹⁰² served as an example where posts containing this narrative have some validity. Similarly, the portrayal of "cruel" Polish "killer cyborg" border guards defending against illegal immigration on the Belarusian border was presented as evidence that the EU is not genuinely concerned about human rights.¹⁰³ Other posts claimed that the EU is undemocratic or has double standards due to its support for the "fascist behavior of the Russophobic militarist regimes in the Baltic States toward the Russian minority."¹⁰⁴ The potential homelessness of Ukrainian refugees in Hungary, due to the government stopping support, was also presented as contradictory to Europe's support for Ukraine.¹⁰⁵

While some of these posts contained a grain of truth, many were outright lies. One post claimed that it was the Western Munich Agreement with Hitler, rather than the Russian, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, that led to the Second World War. The post concluded that, in a similar fashion, the West is currently "aiding Nazism" in the Baltic States.¹⁰⁶ The alleged refusal of a Norwegian ship to rescue drowning Russian sailors, as well as a quote – "The genocide of Russians is ridiculous" – attributed to the German Chancellor, were framed as evidence of an anti-Russian "Nazi" European "Übermensch" sentiment.¹⁰⁷ Another post suggested that while Lithuanians are sending donations to Ukraine, their true hidden agenda is to traffic Ukrainian women into Lithuanian brothels.¹⁰⁸ As can be seen from these quotes, these posts also appealed to **moral outrage** by frequently using derogatory, emotionally charged language when referring to the West.

Sub-narrative: **Weak West**

Some posts framed the West as weak, with a particular focus on the decline of the US. These posts portrayed the U.S. as losing global influence, leading to the emergence of a multipolar world,¹⁰⁹ and ridiculed President Biden as an old "grandpa" who is not in control of his "tongue and bowels."¹¹⁰ Other posts targeted Western-led international organizations like the UN and NATO, both of which were depicted as ineffective and irrelevant. The UN was characterized as only capable of producing "useless" documents¹¹¹ and unable to influence Israel.¹¹² NATO summits were dismissed as "meaningless PR" exercises, lacking substance.¹¹³ Similarly, NATO's ammunition supply to Ukraine was portrayed as insufficient compared to Russia's production and reserves.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, NATO was framed as dependent on China and Russia for essential minerals.¹¹⁵ This sub-narrative constructed an image of Western weakness, contrasting it with Russian strength, undermining confidence in Western institutions and suggesting their inevitable decline.

There is a clear contradiction within this messaging, which portrays the West as both an aggressive, expansionist threat and a weak, decaying force in global affairs. Nevertheless, all of these narratives serve a unified purpose: to portray the West in a consistently negative light. Propaganda is not concerned with logical consistency. No matter what the West says or does, *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics* (drawing from Kremlin and Russian media playbooks) will find a way to spin it negatively. This dual portrayal also serves a strategic function: fear of Western aggression fuels defensive Russian nationalism and justifies hardline policies, while contempt for Western weakness and hypocrisy reinforces the idea that Russia is morally and strategically superior.

Minor Narratives

Occasionally, monitored posts in the six outlets contained other narratives. However, since most of them were present in only a few posts, they do not appear to resonate strongly with the audience of these outlets. Therefore, this report will not delve into most of them. Two narratives, however, stood out, with a significant number of posts devoted to each.

Narratives:

Decadent Liberal Values – Portrays LGBTQIA+ rights, immigration, and progressive values as extreme threats to traditional norms, while misrepresenting the Latvian government's actual positions on these issues to provoke moral outrage among conservatives.

Supporting Russia in War – Depicts Ukraine as both a Nazi aggressor and a failing state, while glorifying Russian military success and delegitimizing Western support for Ukraine.

Looking at other narratives present in the monitored outlets (see Table 7), *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics* posted content supportive of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Occasionally *Baltijas Balss*, *Press*, and more often *Roslikov* accounts disseminated narratives criticizing Decadent Liberal Values. It is important to note that these channels promoting this latter narrative are domestic sources, not originating from Russia. *Sprats in Exile* contained several less prominent, unique narratives, such as calling on followers to leave Latvia and move to Russia. These narratives reflect the unique focus of each monitored outlet, with each emphasizing specific topics that resonate more with their audience.

TABLE 7: Number of posts containing other narratives within each outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics
Decadent Liberal Values	2	3	8	0	0	3
Supporting Russia in War	0	0	0	0	9	13
Other minor narratives	0	3	0	10	1	11

Sub-narrative: **Decadent Liberal Values**

A portion of monitored social media posts, particularly on *Roslikov*'s Telegram channel, promoted a conservative narrative that portrays liberal values as decadent and threatening. *Baltijas Balss* and *Press* only hinted at this narrative, for example, reporting that the fashion of furies had reached Latvian youth¹¹⁶ and criticizing immigrant food delivery couriers who allegedly do not adhere to Western sanitary norms.¹¹⁷ *Roslikov* was more direct in his Telegram posts, stating, "There is a Man and a Woman!"¹¹⁸ By sharing this and similar content, he likely sought to tap into the moral outrage of conservatives towards liberal norms, which they perceive as having gone too far in the West. For example, *Roslikov* viewed the opening ceremony of the Paris Olympic Games as a "ball of Satanists and paedophiles."¹¹⁹ These posts reflect an attempt to mobilize conservative sentiment by portraying liberal values as a destructive force.

However, some of *Roslikov's* posts specifically targeted Latvia. He claimed that the “Rainbow Government” of Latvia supports “men's participation in women's sports” and parents changing the sex of their children.¹²⁰ Similarly, he posted images critical of immigrants in Latvia wearing traditional clothing¹²¹ and criticized the LGBT community and their supporters.¹²² These posts appear designed to provoke outrage through exaggeration and misrepresentation of the government's position, which is not particularly supportive of the agenda *Roslikov* claims it is.

Sub-narrative: **Supporting Russia in War**

A significant portion of the most popular posts in *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics* were supportive of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. They falsely characterized Ukrainian forces as “inhumane” “Nazis”¹²³ targeting civilians, while portraying Ukraine's government as an illegitimate “junta”¹²⁴ run by a “drug addict” president.¹²⁵ These posts created a contradictory depiction of Ukraine as both aggressive and weak, yet desperate for peace.¹²⁶ Overall, these narratives sought to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy while reinforcing Russia's justification for its actions.

On the other hand, posts with this narrative exaggerated Russian military successes¹²⁷ while inflating Ukrainian losses with questionable casualty figures¹²⁸ to create the impression of an inevitable Russian victory.¹²⁹ Monitored posts glorified Russian civilians and volunteers as heroes,¹³⁰ contrasting them with the allegedly cruel Ukrainian forces.¹³¹ Overall, these posts aimed to reinforce the image of Russian superiority and the inevitability of its victory in Ukraine, while simultaneously discrediting Ukraine.

Both of these narratives, though less central, reveal key content strategies that complement the broader messaging of specific outlets. The Decadent Liberal Values narrative, primarily promoted by *Roslikov's* account, aligns with his broader populist, anti-government stance by attacking the government's perceived support for liberal and progressive values. Conversely, the Supporting Russia in War narrative, heavily featured in *Baltnews* and *Antifascists of Pribaltics*, reinforces pro-Kremlin geopolitical aims and indicates a closer alignment with the Russian government compared to the other monitored outlets.

Conclusions

This research reveals a coherent and persistent narrative ecosystem within problematic Russian-language social media outlets in Latvia that amplifies division and undermines public confidence in both domestic governance and Western alliances. Across six monitored outlets – ranging from two local Facebook news pages to overtly pro-Kremlin Telegram channels – four dominant master narratives prevail: Russophobia, Bad West, Failed State, and Economic Hardships. These narratives account for more than half of the most viewed and engaged-with posts. The monitored outlets rarely present new events as standalone stories; instead, they consistently frame developments through the lens of pre-existing master narratives – simplified, emotionally resonant frameworks that help audiences interpret complex issues. This is precisely the function of master narratives in propaganda: to offer accessible cognitive shortcuts that tap into pre-existing beliefs and identities.

Different outlets play distinct roles within this ecosystem. *Baltijas Balss* and *Press*, while not openly pro-Kremlin since 2022, continue to amplify divisive domestic narratives rooted in perceived ethnic discrimination and economic grievances. *Roslikov's* Telegram channel exemplifies populist anti-government rhetoric, blending anti-elite messaging with narratives of Russian-speaker victimhood. He is not doing it for Moscow, but for votes – to build political capital for his party, Stability! Meanwhile, *Sprats in Exile*, *Baltnews*, and especially *Antifascists of Pribaltics* serve as ideological hardliners, pushing radical pro-Kremlin and anti-Western messages – including open support for Russia's war in Ukraine – with the most emotionally charged, blatant disinformation. While the latter three outlets have clear affiliation with Russian propaganda machinery, the first three outlets serve domestic political actors or disseminate these narratives for political or financial gain.

On one hand, at the heart of this narrative ecosystem lies one of propaganda's oldest tricks: repetition. The narratives identified in this study aren't persuasive because they're new or clever. They are persuasive because they are familiar. Russia has been deploying many of these narratives since the 1990s.^{xxii} Some even date back to the Soviet occupation of Latvia. The current messaging taps into pre-existing values, attitudes, and beliefs that have been shaped over decades, if not entire lifetimes. At the same time, this constant drip of familiar messaging continues to shape identities, gradually aligning audiences' worldviews with the idea that Latvia is broken, the West is hostile, and Russia is the misunderstood victim. That's the real power of propaganda: it's not about changing minds overnight – it's about colonizing the cognitive space, until the truth is automatically filtered through a distorted lens.

These narratives are so deeply embedded in their audiences that even neutral or positive information is often filtered through them. This dynamic is particularly evident in reactions to high-quality content republished by *Baltijas Balss* and *Press* from credible sources. Audiences in the comment sections frequently dismiss positive stories about Latvia as jokes or propaganda simply because they conflict with their deeply embedded expectations. In this context, audiences are not passive recipients, but active participants in reinforcing pre-established narrative frames. These narratives are so deeply embedded that it becomes easier for problematic local actors to tap into them for popularity or profit, rather than invest in developing new frames – exactly what *Roslikov*, *Press*, and *Baltijas Balss* are doing. Without aligning themselves with these deeply embedded narratives, they would have little chance of gaining traction within this segment of the Russian-speaking audience.

^{xxii} Denisenko, V. (2015). *The basic concepts of the Baltic States image in the Russian periodical press after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991–2009)*. Journalism Research. No. 8, pp. 123-124.

On the other hand, beneath the surface of repetition lies a deeper insight: Kremlin's propaganda is not all powerful – it is stuck. The same four master narratives are recycled endlessly. Monitored outlets rely on decades old, deeply embedded stories, not new, innovative or unique manipulation methods. Their structure is predictable, their rhetorical devices are familiar. Russia's propaganda machine is running well because of it's decades long investment in the Russian speaking audience, instead of unique and new methods. These narratives function more as identity reinforcement mechanisms than as tools of persuasion. In other words, they are preaching to the converted, not converting the undecided. This is not what winning the information war looks like.

However, Latvia is not winning the information war either. Banning Russian-based or controlled TV channels and online news outlets was a step in the right direction, but this restrictive approach represents just a small step forward. The often-lauded strategy of fact-checking is largely irrelevant in combating narratives covered in this report. First, most fact-checking over the past decade has been conducted in Latvian and has been unlikely to reach Russophone audiences. Second, even when it does reach the target audience, it represents a drop in the bucket compared to the constant flow of Kremlin-aligned messaging. Third, and most importantly, fact-checking targets easily debunked and, frankly, fringe stories. The majority of problematic content identified through this social media monitoring cannot be addressed with the blunt instrument of simplistic fact-checking.

Getting ahead of these narratives is an extremely difficult task. Not because Russian propaganda is sophisticated, but because it often taps into real and valid socioeconomic and political issues and divisions. Kremlin-aligned narratives gain traction not due to the ingenuity of monitored outlets, but because they exploit genuine and unresolved domestic grievances among Latvia's Russian-speaking population. Latvian state has a trust gap with its Russophone minority, and others – Russia, populists, or radical influencers – are filling it. Where public trust in state institutions, socioeconomic equity, or ethnic cohesion is weak, narratives of Russophobia, state failure, and economic decline flourish organically – with or even without foreign coordination. The focus only on “information” in the so-called “information war” is misleading. The winning strategy would focus on addressing deeply rooted domestic political and socioeconomic vulnerabilities that enable Russia's propaganda's success.

Attachments

ATTACHMENT 1: Number of posts containing narratives and sub-narratives within each outlet

	Baltijas Balss	Press	Roslikov	Sprats in Exile	Baltnews	Antifascists of Pribaltics	Share of monitored posts
Russophobia	11	19	19	24	17	20	18%
Latvians Harass Russian Speakers	8	11	4	0	3	3	5%
Government discriminates Russophones	3	8	8	11	10	3	7%
Persecution of Russian Speakers	0	0	7	13	3	10	6%
Other Russophobia narratives	0	0	0	0	1	4	1%
Economic Hardships	8	16	8	2	3	5	7%
Rising Costs of Living	8	1	0	0	0	1	2%
Economic Decline	0	10	0	2	2	3	3%
Government Economic Mismanagement	0	4	8	0	1	1	2%
Other Economy narratives	0	1	0	0	0	0	0%
Failed State	5	5	38	8	7	11	12%
Incompetent Government	5	1	6	3	4	4	4%
Government Economic Mismanagement	0	4	8	0	1	1	2%
Corrupt and Self-Serving Government	0	0	23	2	0	1	4%
Other anti-government narratives	0	0	1	3	2	5	2%
Bad West	0	0	5	9	28	36	13%
Aggressive West	0	0	2	7	13	20	7%
Hypocritical West	0	0	1	2	8	7	3%
Weak West	0	0	1	0	7	2	2%
Other West narratives	0	0	1	0	0	7	1%
Decadent Liberal Values	2	3	8	0	0	3	3%
Supporting Russia in War	0	0	0	0	9	13	4%
Other narratives	0	3	0	10	1	11	4%

ATTACHMENT 2: Most popular master and sub-narratives for each monitored outlet

Outlet	Most popular master narrative	Most popular sub-narrative
Baltijas Balss 	Russophobia Economic Hardships Failed State	- Latvians Harassing Russian Speakers - Rising Costs of Living - Incompetent Government
Press 	Russophobia Economic Hardships	- Latvians Harass Russian Speakers - Government Discriminates Russophones - Economic Decline
Roslikov 	Failed State Russophobia	- Corrupt and Self-Serving Government - Government Economic Mismanagement - Government Discriminates Russophones
Sprats in Exile 	Russophobia Bad West	- Persecution of Russian Speakers - Government discriminates Russophones - Aggressive West
Baltnews 	Bad West Russophobia Supporting Russia In War	- Aggressive West - Government discriminates Russophones - Supporting Russia In War
Antifscists of Pribaltics 	Bad West Supporting Russia In War Russophobia	- Aggressive West - Supporting Russia In War - Persecution of Russian Speakers

Referenced Social Network Posts

- ¹ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1085355093591364>
- ² <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1122980929828780>
- ³ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1024023616391179>
- ⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1103449638457349>
- ⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1094629576006022>
- ⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1058842599575947>
- ⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1014729203996060>
- ⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1085355093591364>
- ⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1115752187218321>
- ¹⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/997002729102041>
- ¹¹ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1095404542595192>
- ¹² <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1015604277241886>
- ¹³ <https://press.lv/post/ispoganennoe-utro-pod-oknom-latyshki-musorshhiki-boltayut-na-russkom>
- ¹⁴ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49085>
- ¹⁵ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/54392>
- ¹⁶ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/54388>
- ¹⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1100110388791274>
- ¹⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1010316427761898>
- ¹⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1118304170305229>
- ²⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1112331900893683>
- ²¹ https://telegram.me/news_lv/40209
- ²² <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1100110388791274>
- ²³ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1134659628669683>
- ²⁴ <https://press.lv/post/direktor-shkoly-perehod-na-latyshskij-yazyk-obucheniya-tyazhelee-vsego-prohodit-u-4-h-i-7-h-klassov>
- ²⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1030896239046023>
- ²⁶ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3216>
- ²⁷ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3173>
- ²⁸ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3212>
- ²⁹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3176>
- ³⁰ https://telegram.me/news_lv/37558
- ³¹ https://telegram.me/news_lv/44495
- ³² https://telegram.me/news_lv/42301
- ³³ https://telegram.me/news_lv/38018
- ³⁴ https://telegram.me/news_lv/39725
- ³⁵ https://telegram.me/news_lv/39762
- ³⁶ https://telegram.me/news_lv/44435
- ³⁷ https://telegram.me/news_lv/43530
- ³⁸ https://telegram.me/news_lv/45036
- ³⁹ https://telegram.me/news_lv/39080
- ⁴⁰ https://telegram.me/news_lv/38018
- ⁴¹ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11563>
- ⁴² <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11911>
- ⁴³ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11166>
- ⁴⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/997720659021475>
- ⁴⁵ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/9279>
- ⁴⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1123876833072523>
- ⁴⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/998125145647693>
- ⁴⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1077564991037041>
- ⁴⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1086941036774876>
- ⁵⁰ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3215>
- ⁵¹ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1025573896244924>
- ⁵² <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1042339511226256>
- ⁵³ https://telegram.me/news_lv/39186
- ⁵⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1103782251757421>
- ⁵⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1061296376006009>
- ⁵⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1007645718037742>
- ⁵⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/1003086145160366>
- ⁵⁸ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3271>
- ⁵⁹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3170>
- ⁶⁰ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3215>
- ⁶¹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3244>
- ⁶² <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3153>
- ⁶³ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/48666>
- ⁶⁴ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11829>
- ⁶⁵ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11912>
- ⁶⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1039405871519620>
- ⁶⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1024090926384448>
- ⁶⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1120157200111153>
- ⁶⁹ https://telegram.me/news_lv/36950
- ⁷⁰ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3130>
- ⁷¹ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50138>
- ⁷² <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49525>
- ⁷³ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/10396>
- ⁷⁴ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11275>
- ⁷⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/998838785585102/posts/999382058864108>
- ⁷⁶ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3244>
- ⁷⁷ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3162>
- ⁷⁸ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3231>
- ⁷⁹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3199>
- ⁸⁰ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3240>
- ⁸¹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3159>
- ⁸² <https://telegram.me/baltnews/52945>
- ⁸³ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/51398>
- ⁸⁴ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49266>
- ⁸⁵ https://telegram.me/news_lv/40629
- ⁸⁶ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11699>
- ⁸⁷ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/51063>
- ⁸⁸ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/48860>
- ⁸⁹ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/52033>
- ⁹⁰ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11711>
- ⁹¹ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49448>
- ⁹² <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/9198>
- ⁹³ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/48537>
- ⁹⁴ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11161>
- ⁹⁵ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/51398>
- ⁹⁶ https://telegram.me/news_lv/40629
- ⁹⁷ https://telegram.me/news_lv/41170
- ⁹⁸ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/10432>
- ⁹⁹ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/10294>
- ¹⁰⁰ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/9789>
- ¹⁰¹ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11909>
- ¹⁰² <https://telegram.me/baltnews/53115>
- ¹⁰³ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/52610>
- ¹⁰⁴ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50354>
- ¹⁰⁵ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50731>
- ¹⁰⁶ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/11949>
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- ¹⁰⁸ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/51258>
- ¹⁰⁹ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/9233>
- ¹¹⁰ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/51459>
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- ¹¹⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/996817975778410/posts/1065345195592354>
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- ¹¹⁸ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3112>
- ¹¹⁹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3253>
- ¹²⁰ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3188>
- ¹²¹ <https://telegram.me/Roslikovs/3249>
- ¹²² <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50199>
- ¹²³ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/53667>
- ¹²⁴ <https://telegram.me/antifalivland/9366>
- ¹²⁵ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/53667>
- ¹²⁶ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49608>
- ¹²⁷ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49908>
- ¹²⁸ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/49927>
- ¹²⁹ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50700>
- ¹³⁰ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50199>
- ¹³¹ <https://telegram.me/baltnews/50199>